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HANS URS VON BALTHASAR

THE FREEDOM OF THE SUBJECT
In the sphere of knowledge, we can speak of the subject's freedom only in a relative way, that is, in a way that does not violate the
subject's basic receptivity. Spiritual spontaneity will never totally free
itself from this basic receptivity. Concepts without percepts are empty.
Even when an item of knowledge transcends sense, it nevertheless has
begun with sense experience. Finally, the subject is not free to think
as it pleases. It does not have the sort of freedom which can reveal itself or conceal itself. The subject, by its very nature, must order itself
according to the structure which is being manifested to it. The very
advantage of the subject is its ability to conceive things as they are. It
can extend and enrich its own limited perfection by means of the differing perfections of its fellow beings and thereby become a reflection
of the universe itself. In order to attain this good, the knower must
first place himself at the service of things.
Nevertheless, knowledge involves spontaneity. This is an expression
of the subject's inwardness. The act of knowledge would not be spiritual if there were no freedom in it. Hence we come to consider the
question of the subject's openness to reality.
First of all, the subject, as the person of freedom, must turn to certain objects which it wants to assume in itself. It can observe, envisage
and choose, as objects of investigation, objects which are agreeable to
its own drive for knowledge. From the infinite realm of the knowable,
it can extract that part which seems proportioned to itself and which
is integrated with the circle of things which it prefers to call its "worldpicture." Insofar as the subject has this freedom of orientation, it also
has a freedom to turn away from things which do not agree with it
and which it regards as perturbing to or superfluous for the construction of its "world." Although many things do enter into the field of
sense experience, without having been invited, the subject always retains the possibility of sifting and sieving them and of leaving most of
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them in a sort of ante-chamber while it inwardly orients itself and
restricts itself to those things which correspond to its own interests. This
exclusion of most of that which is impressed upon us, this strict mental
censorship over the material of knowledge, delivered to us through the
senses, points to a deficiency in our knowing power which, limited by
the narrowness of its consciousness, can grasp only a modest selection
of that which is presented to it; simultaneously, it is also a sign of the
ordering and constructive freedom of spirit which chooses only those
things from a manifold of presented materials which conform to its
inner structure.
This freedom of choice does not consist solely in a preference for certain elements and the rejection of others; more important, it is free to
review those things which do not fit into one's already existing schemes.
Mentally, one can completely overlook what he is sentiently forced to
see; indeed, there is no such thing as an apperception in which sifting
and sieving have not already taken place. Part of the nobility of spirit
is that it is not compelled to come to terms with everything, especially
when it lacks guiding principles. In the service of a higher commitment
to truth, it can decline contact and intercourse with innumerable inessential facts. It is a sign of a true knower that he decides for all time
not to want the knowledge of certain things and hence foregoes knowledge of them. A fecund power of forgetting stands at his disposal. This
power, by its very omission of a great many things, is the condition for
the creation of essential knowledge since it provides the necessary background in terms of which a "world-of-truth" can be manifested. Free
receptivity is possible only by means of the negative possibility of an
obliterating oversight.
A voluntary openness towards desired and welcome truths complements the voluntary exclusion of inopportune truths. This openness,
this movement of the subject towards the object, is a necessary condition for the occurrence and full attainment of knowledge. Throughout,
it is a movement which, intellectually, both conditions and promotes
knowledge. This does not hinder it from being at the same time a
moment of will and freedom and thus related to the sphere of ethics.
Indeed it is the pure choice (conditioned, of course, by a free ethical
attitude toward the ultimate questions of existence) of those things one
is willing to acknowledge and out of which one forms his "worldpicture." The subject has the "world-view" which he wants to have and
the view presented to him by his spirit did not come into existence
without the co-operation of his freedom. Having achieved knowledge,
the will does not trouble itself to evaluate and choose; rather it is
present within the act of knowledge itself and acts as a viewing and
emphasizing factor. There is always any number of possibilities to
consider in any individual object. Those which I choose to consider
depend on where my preferences are drawing me.
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This leads us to an insight into the role of freedom in knowledge
which has even broader implications; namely, that it is not only the
choice of the individual details of knowledge that is conditioned by the
will, but also the very openness of the subject himself. The openness
of the subject himself would be inconceivable without a certain intervention of the will. It is self-evident that this openness is not to be
viewed merely as an act of free personal choice; much more it is the
very sign in the will (voluntas ut natura) of that which personal freedom (voluntas elicita) will be. If a subject wanted nothing, it would
never know anything. A part of the subject's will is totally involved in
the act of knowledge. And once knowledge is attained, this aspect of the
will is used up; another part, however, going forward in conjunction
with knowledge, transcends and indeed uses this knowledge as a means
for pursuing its own goals. Only in the pathway of a will already in
motion is the act of knowledge accomplished. Here the two questions
as to the meaning of the subject and object encounter each other. Truth
exists in the object in such a way that it is constantly revealing itself;
the object nevertheless always remains truer and richer than any of its
"self-revelations." This movement is nothing other than the inner elucidation of being in which the object becomes subject. Enlarging upon
this from the perspective of the subject, we can state that the impetus
of its "disclosing of itself," is to be discovered behind every one of its
manifestations; this is to say that behind its spiritual elucidation as
intelligence, there is to be found an abiding will towards self-disclosure
and revelation.
Once again, there is no irrationality in this outlook. It simply
views thought as finite and conditioned and will as infinite and
conditioning. The voluntary disclosure as such is not irrational;
rather it is the supreme and definitive meaning of the whole of
ratio itself: the ultimate justification of all being in its essence and
existence, the presupposition to which ultimately all suppositions are
reduced and without which all being and all events would remain unintelligible and meaningless. An existent has meaning only when it has
"a being-for-itself," only if it has the impetus of participation. Indeed,
"being-for-itself" and participation are one and the same; they form
together the one indivisible elucidation of being. This means that the
meaning of being lies in love and that knowledge is explicable only
through love and for love. The object's willingness to unlock itself
(i.e., make itself accessible to the subject) and the subject's willingness
to be open enough to perceive the object are really two sides of the
same coin; namely, an act of submission which makes itself known in
two ways. Hence, we gain the insight that love is not separable from
truth. There can no more be knowledge without the will than there can
be truth without love. Love is not beyond truth; it is that aspect of truth
which over and above all its disclosures guards an ever new secret; it
HANS URS VON BALTHASAR
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is the eternal "more than what one knows" without which there would
neither be a knowledge nor even a knowable. It is that in reality which
is never permitted to be a mere fact and that in knowledge which is
not permitted to rest in itself, but which is always attending to something beyond. The concept of love belongs to the full concept of truth
just as the concept of will belongs to the full concept of knowledge.
Certainly, it is possible for a "non-lover" to grasp particular truth
correctly; but his understanding is similar to the eyesight of a shortsighted person: his view for detail is sharp—indeed extra sharp—he is
nevertheless incapable of embracing broad perspectives of truth. Not
entirely without reason do we say that the will is simultaneously clever
and stupid. Since truth can be attained only through love, it is only the
lover who has the proper vision for truth. He alone is truly willing to
disclose himself and thereby attain that wherein the truth of being
emerges. He alone is in a position to accept the queries and appeals of
a person who has entrusted himself to him, who has opened himself
to him and who perhaps has sought help from him. Thus, once again
he exercises that action in the course of which the truth of knowledge
arises. Indeed, one can say that truth arises from love and that love is
more basic and more universal than truth. It is the ground of truth;
it is that which explains truth and makes it possible. Nevertheless, it
cannot be said that love was there before the truth and that it would
be conceivable without the truth. For that self-disclosure of being and
knowledge which bears in a more basic sense the name of love, bears
also immediately and directly the name of truth.
However, we are primarily concerned with the freedom of the subject
as his possibility to truth in a personal way towards the object, i.e., to
approach it by means of a special attentiveness. The attentiveness is
part of the full execution and completion of a relation to the truth,
though formally it is left to the free decision of the knower. Indeed, this
attentiveness can assume a double form corresponding to the previously
discussed double character of the truth.
The conscious and free orientation toward the object of knowledge
is characterized by an honest and serious availability. The subject, as it
were, lays its entire subjectivity aside in order to be nothing but a pure
perceiving openness for the object. In this renunciation of self in order
better to grasp something strange to it, lies the destruction of all prejudice and of all else which might hinder the pure grasping of the object.
It requires no small amount of exertion for the spontaneity of the subject to bring it to a point where it wishes for nothing more than the
capacity to assimilate the object. The subject renounces its own word in
order to hear the word pronounced by the object. It does this in order
not to interrupt the speech of things which want to express themselves.
It has decided that justice be done to things. This desire that justice be
done to things is already an act of love because it prefers the good of
H
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the other and the truth of the other to one's own particular good and
to one's own particular truth. This position of actually desiring to listen
cannot be surpassed so far as a relationship to truth is concerned. Even
when another position is formed over it, it remains the unshakeable
basis on which everything else builds and against which everything else
must be tested over and over again because in it are signified the rectitude and the soundness of love.
If unaccompanied by any other factor, this free orientation towards
the object, on the part of the subject, could become a cold objectivity,
a sort of impressive silence in which the voice of the object resounds
as though it were lost and without protection. For such a knower things
would stand like defendants before the bar of justice—indeed, defendants
who could be sure of nothing but the impartiality of the judge. Such a
sober attitude would not truly be a genuine approach on the part of
the subject—it would not be a movement of knowledge toward the object.
Now it was previously shown how things must fulfill themselves in the
sphere of subjectivity. Objects are pointed out to them and placed at
their disposal in order that these objects can unfold possibilities which
could not be presented elsewhere. At the beginning of this article we
depicted subjectivity in terms of necessity—i.e., in terms of the necessity
of the subject to conform to the object. At this point we should like to
consider it in terms of the freedom of the subject: this is to say that
those things which express themselves to the subject should feel at home
with the being that knows them. There might be a certain reserve, a
certain timidity in things before they reveal themselves to the subject.
It would be the business of the subject in this case to overcome this
timidity on the part of the object. It would do this by assuming an
inviting approach. It is not infrequent that penitents come to confession
and do not have the courage to confess their sins without the aid and
encouragement of the priest: they request the priest to interrogate them.
Likewise in the act of knowledge, the subject may have the job of
assisting the object toward its own truth. For very frequently, an object
of knowledge is waiting for a knower to know it as it does not even
know itself. It approaches the knower with an ideal image of the power
of knowledge at the knower's disposal. The object would like to be
observed from a spiritual standpoint. It would prefer to disclose its
innermost parts to a person to whom it could show itself naked without
danger just as a patient uncovers himself before a doctor. This disclosure
is not an end in itself; much more the physician should recognize in the
naked body what the sick person may perhaps feel himself, but which
he cannot make clear. The doctor has a technical view which sees things
which are truly at hand, but which nobody except him can bring from
obscurity to the light of day; a model discloses himself to the artist in
the expectation of being viewed by his eye as no one but the artist can
view him—not even as the model can see himself if he accidentally
HANS URS VON BALTHASAR
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glances into a mirror. This special vision from which the object expects
so much leads into the sanctuary of knowledge. In order to describe it
properly, two assertions must be made and neither one can give way to
the other. This special vision which is possible only through a loving
orientation, is at the same time an objective as well as an idealizing
vision. That both of these qualities are reconcilable is the great hope of
the person being known. The ideality, which it cannot make concrete
by itself, it hopes to attain in the realm of another's being. It knows, or
better still, divines what it could be, what splendid possibilities may
lie in it. But in order to bring them to bloom, it needs some one who
believes in it; better still, it needs someone who sees in it its hiddenness
already existing objectively, but visibly only to one who holds its realization as possible, in short, to one who believes and loves. Many persons
only await a lover in order to become what they already could have become. It is also possible that the lover, with his mysterious, creative
vision, has discovered possibilities which, to the person who possessed
them, were completely unknown and to whom they would have appeared
as unbelievable. It is like a trellis plant that can bear its fruit only after
it has climbed strange staffs and wires.
That is the genuine mystery of freedom in knowledge. It is throughout, like all true mysteries, a mystery of love. The ideal image of the
object of knowledge which the loving knower shelters is equally subjective and objective. It is subjective because it is only through a subject that it attains actual objective truth, just as a fruit can attain
ripeness only in a definite climate. Without first having the ideal presented to it through the knower, it would never have occurred to the
"known" to strive for it or it would have become discouraged because
the attempt seemed too fantastic. The belief and confidence of a knower
who is quickened by love is required for the person known, to have faith
and confidence in the ideal set before him. It is at the bidding of love
that it dares to be what, alone, it would not have ventured to do. The
lover will always consider the image which he holds before the beloved
to be an objective one. He knows that the possibility which he sees is
an incarnated possibility of the beloved. It is not contrived by the lover;
it is elucidated by him. In his eyes it would lose all worth if it were
merely a product of his subjective imaginary power. The image was
only concealed in the beloved and the glance of love had to come to
lift it from the depths. Thus the lover will always regard the realization
of the ideal as an act of the beloved. If it is achieved, he will be happy
to have known that the beloved could do it, that he was not deceived
in believing in him. On the other hand, the beloved will know that the
realization of his best possibilities is not especially due to himself; rather
he will see that it is due to the creative work of love which gave him the
initial impulse and held the ideal mirror before him and thus loaned
him his powers. Every distinction between subject and object becomes
18
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weak in this creative event. The image which love saw and held up is
doubtlessly an image of the object. But not an image of the object as
it is; rather, it is an image of the object as it could be. It is the ideal
and not the actual reality of the object. This ideal reality exists nowhere
but in the love of the subject. Only in this realm can the ideal bloom.
There is no such thing as a freely hovering "ideal reality" in some
kind of impersonal abstract "realm of pure evaluations." The genuine
place for these ideal images is the personal love of another being.
The erection of such an image and its slow or quick realization must
be seen as an actual creative act in which the lover co-operates with the
beloved and both strive to shape reality according to the ideal exemplar
held before them. If a real or even an approximate gain is made, the
object has achieved its genuine truth; what was hidden is made manifest;
what was possible, made concrete and indeed according to the very
meaning of its original idea. It must not be forgotten that the idea was
well seen and creatively delineated by the lover and it is his ideal that
has been incarnated and in such a way that from this point forward, he
is what he is thanks to the lover who presented him with a true image
of himself.
The realization of the ideal and more basic image does not take place
by steps. It does not accomplish itself in such a way that one can tell
from period to period how far the process of realization has progressed
as though the progress could be measured in proportion to the object's
striving and exertions towards the proposed ideal. Such a presentation
of the creative act of loving knowledge would have all the restrictions
of free knowledge. The knower would have to be content to hold an
image before the person known in a sort of disinterested impartiality
and he would leave the imitation of this image up to the other. The
product of his free knowledge would lie in an "image of knowledge"
and would exhaust itself in it and would pass over to the person known
the task of making this image concrete. But that would not be loving
knowledge in the full sense of the word. Much more, the proposed image
contains in itself a power of reality and realization. The lover holds the
ideal image of the beloved as the beloved's true reality and he orients
himself toward it in his action. He looks upon this "true" image of the
beloved; he addresses himself to it; he acts toward him as though he
were this image. Thus he overlooks the other, the real, but incomplete
image. Not that he would deceive himself concerning the unfulfilled
reality in enthusiastic blindness akin to the blindness of passionate love.
Neither would he view the affinity of the ideal and real as already actualized. Indeed, he sees the distance between the ideal and real, but at
the same time, he overlooks it. He is not interested in the faults of the
beloved. It is precisely through overlooking these faults that he overcomes them. He lets the real, incomplete image of the beloved simply
sink into nothingness. In the eyes of the lover, this image has no worth,
HANS URS VON BALTHASAR
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no consistency, no right to exist. It is as though it has been scratched
out, banned from the cosmos of existing things. T h e honor of being
known is not conferred upon it. It is not accorded such an importance
that it may reveal itself as though it possessed a definite and seriously
considered truth. Its annihilation is actually accomplished by means of
not paying attention to it and by denying it the opportunity of full
self-disclosure.
An existing thing which is denied the right of self-disclosure (i.e., the
right to truth) will finally perish from a lack of air and light. T h a t
which should not exist, will be treated by love as a being with no claims
on existence. Love punishes this creature simply by overlooking it. T h e
creative presentation of the ideal image consequently has as its complement the creative destruction of the real image. The beloved must
harmonize himself with this twofold creative process which characterizes
loving knowledge. In order to attain the ideal which is treated as the
real, he has only to act as if the ideal were already real; in order to
effect the disappearance of the real which must be destroyed, all that
he has to do is act as though it already did not exist. The beloved
should have a full view of the creative process in the mind of the lover.
He should know that the lover has known the defective reality and that
in this regard he is an objective knower and not a starry-eyed painter
or naive paramour. He should know that the movement of love has this
actual objective point of "exact" knowledge as its point of departure
but that it also abandons this point of departure and turns its back on
it in order to have access consciously to the other reality of the ideal as
the true and valid image. He should know: this person who knows me,
in and through love, recognizes in me a person who is different than the
person I appear to be. He has done this by referring my present actuality to a future actuality which only a lover could have seen. In the
power of this affirmation the beloved himself will find the strength to
bring about a transition in his state.
This is the way in which we gain this portentous knowledge; namely,
that there is not only a knowledge and truth which reveals and discloses, but also knowledge and truth which conceals and veils. Nothing
could be more mistaken than the opinion that the disclosure of that
which has no right to exist can possibly remedy it. One does not cure
a misguided person by directing him to his mistakes. Only in view of
the ideal will he be capable of experiencing sorrow over the real. It is
only in the knowledge that the ideal which appears unattainable to him
is actually anticipated by another knowing agent as the true reality, that
he will find the courage to strive for it. He will, notice with wonder
that it is possible to believe in something which he would never have
dared believe in if left to himself: this thing which he would never have
dared believe in is the annihilation of a fact which should never have
existed in the first place—an annihilation brought about through an
20
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act of creative knowledge. He will become accustomed to understand,
even when he falls back into his old mistakes, that basically he is living
a fact which has already been overcome and which is not actually real.
It is only by means of concealing knowledge that the beloved one is to
be helped. The desire not to see this is one of the unforgivable defects
of psychoanalysis and of most practical schools of psychology. Through
analysis alone one does not achieve any truth, even when the "uncovered" has been so realistically extracted. Life is destroyed by breaking
it down into its parts. Through uncovering that which the Gods have
graciously hidden in the night and covered with horror, one does not
create the conditions for life. Only when the roots of the plant are
hidden in the soil can its crown bloom in health. Likewise, it belongs
to the truth of the living thing that part of it must remain hidden. And
it belongs to the truth of a free and spiritual being that part of itself
must be entrusted to oblivion. Not every truth—as we said before—has a
claim to immortality. An ordered cosmos of truth comes about only
through choice and preference. Much that is hidden must be brought
forward; much that is now in the open must be sent into oblivion.
Now it is clear that such a creative intercourse with the truth places
man in a position of great responsibility. He must know not only what
is, but also what ought to be. Through his knowledge, he should give
a hearing for the judgment and actuality of that which "ought-to-be."
He should hold a guiding image before the persons who trustfully open
themselves to him. Is he not obliged to attain this creative act and make
it concrete? Will he not run the danger of presenting false ideals and
purely subjective deceptions to the object and thus become an occasion
of error and temptation? Does not the subject on his side require a
"guiding image" according to which the ideal of knowledge is modelled?
Knowledge that is not a replica (Abbild) but rather the original archetype (Urbild) of reality, not measured by things but which entails the
truth which measures the things themselves, is fitting fundamentally
only to God. God's knowledge is a test of truth; it is pure spontaneity
without the admixture of any receptivity on the part of the things
known. The truth which his knowledge possesses is the measure of the
truth of all things. Never in the absolute sense can human knowledge
possess the ultimate exemplar of truth. However, it lies under the law
of the analogy of being and secondary causality that God has imparted
to his creatures some of his creative power—indeed even in the realm
of truth. If man possessed a pure faculty of knowing, proportioned to
the truth of things, he would no longer be a cause; rather he would be
a pure effect. His operation would be limited to the possibility of purely
reproducing already existing things. He would indeed be enriched by
his insight into already existing things which surround him; however,
he would have no responsibility of participating himself in the formation of the truth of things. He would have power over secondary causes
HANS URS VON BALTHASAR
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only as one who acts practically; unlike God, he would not have the
power of a knowing subject; it may be that one could accord him this
power for certain limited acts of knowledge; the artistic for example, in
which he could form a fragment of reality according to his freely designed idea. To leave it at that, however, does not seem to do justice to
the analogy of being. The active potency which God has given to his
creatures cannot work itself out in the realm of truth merely in a passing way; it must have a more profound significance than one ordinarily
acknowledges.
There must be an analogy of creative knowledge and it is in this
that there lies the solution of the question concerning the "guiding
image" for the creation of the ideal. God's knowledge of things is the
absolutely first exemplaristic knowledge. He has the idea of things in
himself. This image is the correct one, not because God sees things
more objectively than we do, but rather because the image projected by
him is simultaneously a true subjective-objective image. Because God
sees things in this way, they should be as he sees them. All creaturely
knowledge of men should look up to this image of things laid down by
God. Only in God can a man see another man as he should be. Only
from the perspective of God can he picture the ideal image. Only by
reference to God can he encourage a man to reflect this ideal image.
If he did this without God, then his so-called helpfulness would become
mere presumption and vanity; he would give himself the air of being
better and more clever than his neighbor. From his neighbor he would
demand that he hand himself over to an ideal, and as a finite man, he
would have neither the power nor the authority to make such an absolute demand upon another man. Without God, this supreme activity of
human knowledge remains a Promethean act which can never be
vindicated. Only when one can refer the man to God; only when one
can make him believe that the image of him known by love is the image
of him conserved in God, does he have the right to participate in comoulding the truth of the world. But for this purpose, one must have
learned, or better, have received the grace from God to love and regard
men in God himself wherein the image of knowledge and the image of
love originally coincide.
The Employment of Truth
The object and the subject do not possess the truth simply in itself
as freedom. Insofar as they are nature, they are already set in movement toward the truth. The object is moved to open itself; the subject
is moved to an openness in regard to things. Insofar as they are both
free, they have something to say concerning the causation of this movement. By a free assessment of the situation, they can involve themselves
in the very formation of truth; and so truth is placed in their hands.
22
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God does not want to preside over the truth alone; he has appointed
the human being as a co-administrator.
Witness occurs at the intersection of nature and freedom. Man is
called to bear witness to the truth. It is not at his discretion to decide
whether or not he wants to represent his knowledge accurately. Insofar
as he is being formed by nature to disclose himself and open himself to
others, he cannot be arbitrary in dispensing and administering the
truth. He who reveals himself in truth and who is revealed to others
in truth is not fulfilling some strange law which has been imposed upon
him; he is fulfilling the law of his own being. He necessarily bears witness to the truth because he is a spiritual being. He must obey this imperative because it is inscribed in his innermost essence. This burden,
which is his only happiness, must be assumed by him if he does not
want to destroy his spirit. Indeed, he must assume this burden in such
a way that he is really dedicating himself to this task from which he
cannot withdraw himself. Human truth can be dealt with only
in a free manner. Part of the intimacy of both spheres, the objective as
well as the subjective, is that their truth must be proclaimed in freedom. Nobody can be assured that the truth will come to light without
freedom, nor that truth will see to it on its own that it will be properly manifested. It is placed on the human level, entrusted to the free
revelation of human beings who mutually bear witness to each other's
truth by their freely given disclosures. Since the truth is not, like some
superficial fact, naturally apparent, it must be disclosed by rational activity, and even when disclosed, since it concerns a subject, the author
of the declaration must be absolutely responsible for the reality to
which he bears witness.
Because the employment of truth involves human freedom, many
questions arise as to the rules and limits which are proper to this task.
What norms apply to the person who discloses himself and reveals his
truth? When should he do so, to whom, and in what way? A similar
question may be asked about the person who is open to the truth of
others: what norm exists to guide his reception of truth, since it is impossible for him to place himself unselectively at the disposal of every
truth which crosses his path? Surely the correct choice in both these
cases is guided by the virtue of prudence. In every situation it judges
the correctness or incorrectness of an action, because it knows how to
apply abstract guiding principles to concrete circumstances. Thus it can
be said in general that one should reveal himself to the person who has
a right to the disclosure, who is worthy of confidence, who uses—and
does not abuse—the truth. In any particular case, prudence must tell us
which person combines these qualities. In few areas of human experience is this virtue given so much room for free play; in few places is
it entrusted with so much confidence and laden with so much responsibility. Prudence has been left with only two basic laws: the truth must
HANS URS VON BALTHASAR
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be expressed and it must be expressed freely, that is, with discernment.
It is its task to bridge the wide gap between these general propositions
and their special application. It would, however, inevitably fail if it
were not given a higher guiding principle. Even the virtue of prudence,
to which the unique operation of applying the abstract to the concrete
properly belongs, cannot independently justify this inventive act, for it
must always remain a genuinely creative performance. This virtue must
be able to say why it is prudent to decide in this way. It must raise its
eyes to a supreme norm in which it encounters its decision. Ultimately
this norm must be either egoism or love. All other norms are provisional
in nature, and are oriented to this ultimate choice. A person, for example, can disclose himself discreetly, but the basis and norm of his discretion may be simply his own personal advantage. Someone else may
make it a rule to give access only to those truths of which he enjoys
a hearing, which are adapted to his preconceived images, and which do
not disturb his self-satisfied tranquillity. The decision to follow such a
rule can be carried out with great prudence. Both alternatives associate
freely with the truth; both possess a selective law which is dictated by
prudence. But this law is egoism, and it contradicts the law of love.
We have already seen that love cannot be separated from truth. Indeed,
it stands at the very foundation of the movement of truth, in both the
subject and the object. Love is the meaning of the disclosure of truth as
well as of its reception. Consequently there can be no doubt that love
possesses the rule for any particular application of truth. Egoism, on
the contrary, does not recognize love and cannot know truth in its fullness. It can deal with individual truths and grasp them as material
propositions; it cannot, however, possess them as genuine truth. This
is because the movement carried out in egoism is in immediate conflict with the truth which is guided by love. He who shares truth in
order to profit by it personally may well appear to open himself and
give himself to the other. Nevertheless he is not really doing so. He is,
rather, presenting such an appearance only as a means to conceal himself all the better. Since he contradicts himself in his action, he does
not stand in the truth at all. His self-disclosure, since it merely simulates the movement of love, contains more deception than truth.
Just as genuine egoism is incapable of truth, genuine love is incapable
of any falsehood. Love stands at the very source of truth, and when it
reveals itself, it has no choice but to produce truth. Love is the disinterested communication of one's uniqueness and the disinterested acceptance of the other. In this way it is the predetermined measure of
all truth. Self-communication will be truthful only if it is accompanied
by absolute reverence and devotion, and the acceptance of disclosures
from others can lead to genuine insight only when it is accompanied
by dedication to the person who discloses himself. Just as love produces
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truth, it also possesses the ultimate rule for its application. Love is the
true measure of all giving and all receiving.
Imitations of truth may indeed be found outside of love. Many propositions possess truth in a formal way—perhaps even irrefutably—but
may lack that in terms of which all individual propositions obtain their
truth: the truth of the self-revelation of being. The mouth of the liar
can emit individual truths; it can build systems whose inner logic is
amazing and faultless; but detached from the basic movement of love,
all these formally correct propositions remain in the service of lies and
through their "truth" help to proliferate error. On the other hand, it
may be that love will be in error on an individual detail. But such an
error is innocent and harmless as long as it is embedded in the encompassing movement of love, which of itself is never in error. Within love,
a formal error can do no harm, whereas those truths which are used
outside of love can only breed destruction. We do not mean to say that
a person without love cannot transmit truth in a fruitful way. He is
not the source of the truth he is passing on. The truth of an Augustine
or a Plato can be transmitted by those who do not live inwardly in this
truth. It shines through them in the same way that the sacramental
grace of Christ can reach the recipient regardless of the worthiness of
the administering priest. But this does not happen without a certain
curtailment of the truth. Some of the rays which should have passed
through the medium become absorbed by it, while an ideally suited
medium can increase what it transmits.
One who seeks the law governing the employment of truth can stop
at love and never go wrong. All truths given and received in love have
been properly employed even when they do not appear to be so. It may
be very disagreeable to tell a particular truth or to hear it, but if it is
spoken and received with love, there can be no better communication.
True love will always fulfill and transcend the justice on which it is
based. A love which believes it has the right to disregard justice would
thus be unmasked as an enthusiastic illusion. In the employment of
truth, love can appear to be hard and inexorable; it may insist on a
relentless disclosure of evil, because it can only build on the basis of
truth. It knows when this disclosure of truth is necessary in order that
it can carry out its work fruitfully; it is also aware that it is not always
necessary to disclose the truth. The lover may bury in oblivion much
that the beloved was unaware he knew. On the other hand, many things
must be brought into the open if the relation of love is to remain clear
and transparent. Whatever must be disclosed in order to be quickly
forgiven and forgotten should be revealed only for the sake of love.
Knowledge alone is never sufficient reason for a revelation. It would
serve only to proclaim one's own superiority. The disclosure of truth
may be a proof that one knows more than the other, or perhaps would
like to wound the other under the pretext of harmless utterances. SoHANS URS VON BALTHASAR
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cial conversations which apparently take place on the very best of terms
are often no more than a chain of refined cruelties whose charm lies
in the fact that one can attack just when one's partner is most susceptible and without the usual safeguards. One seems to be giving roses,
but the intention is to stick the partner with a few thorns.
We are not, however, mainly concerned with lying as a perversion of
truth; we are concerned with the abuse of truth as a privation of love.
In the last analysis, of course, both offenses against truth concur. Any
disclosure which is not in love's service is a kind of exhibitionism which
transgresses the laws of love. Not everything has a right to be revealed
at all times. There is more truth in the silence of a love which conceals both itself and the truth than in all the loveless exposure of truth.
Here the relationship of truth to an encompassing and transcending
love is quite clear. Truth has both its measure and limits in the laws
of love; love, on the contrary, has no measure and no limits in anything
but itself.
Love not only limits one's disclosure; it also protects the secret of the
other person. It obtains no truths from another surreptitiously, nor does
it press confessions from him unless a genuinely justified charity demands such a confession—perhaps the higher good of the community
or the very salvation of the person who confesses. In penetrating another's most private thoughts, the lover proceeds more cautiously than
a surgeon with his scalpel. Only an indisputably higher good could justify such an encroachment. He will refuse to hear another's secret if its
revelation is not good for the possessor of the secret. He will not implicate himself in someone else's exhibitionistic abuse of the truth; he
will simply not listen. He will be cautious and even suspicious of any
attempt to reveal the mysteries hidden in the life of a soul, and will
keep in mind how close such intimate exposures may be to prostitution. It is significant that hypnotic power cannot be exercised over the
soul of another without his prior consent. It is inwardly impossible that
a person's intimate self be invaded from without unless it has previously been opened from within. If there is an encroachment on a person's
invulnerable privacy, it is because this was already contained in the
permission given to hypnotize. To justify itself, this surrender of power
demands an atmosphere of love and perfect love, and the acceptance
of such a surrender demands the highest measure of loving responsibility. These natural possibilities have their perfect exemplar in the supernatural phenomenon of the knowledge of hearts, when God, at his
own discretion, grants a person insight into the intimacy of other souls.
Such revelations never occur other than in love and for love, and in
such cases, the laws of discretion and spiritual modesty are never violated. Nothing more is shown than what the duties of Christian love
and its fruitful fulfilment require. In thus disposing of the domain reserved for the freedom of His creatures, God shows us how we are to
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use freedom: that is, with the sole law of love and with exclusive consideration for love. Even freedom does not stand higher than love; its
fulfilment consists in voluntarily surrendering itself to love, and in
placing itself at love's disposal.
If perfect love contains the rule for the manifestation of truth, it also
possesses the rule which permits us to know when truth should not be
manifested. Love may find itself compelled to reveal the truth only partially and with reservations. In such cases, the rule for the employment
of truth is that love should not be parcelled out, or communicated with
reservations. Everything that is necessary is permitted in order to preserve the integrity of love. Nevertheless, this does not mean that love
is permitted to treat truth in a high-handed or careless manner. When
love respects the complete law of truth, it is actually respecting its own
most characteristic vital law. But within this law it must be capable
of moving freely. It cannot make itself a slave of its own law of freedom. Ultimately, nothing is freer than a love that manifests itself unreservedly, making a gift of itself, and it would be contrary to reason
if this most free action of love were enclosed within the fetters of formal
laws. Love must know that, contained within its own law, in its movement of giving, is a freedom higher than obligation to any law.
Thus even the law of truth is placed in love's hands that it may be
employed according to its own essence. In all cases love will assess and
measure out the truth without having to be assessed and measured itself. When love and its own integrity demand it, truth will be dispensed
in a fragmentary and veiled fashion. Truth can tolerate a sharing which
love cannot. As we know it in this world, truth always consists of particular revelations, propositions and judgments, all of which reveal a
limited perspective. Each of these perspectives retains a finite character
and must be complemented by others. No truth about the world is absolute, even if it is genuine. It is truth only when it coheres with the
totality of truth, when it is an expression (though a limited and measured one) of a revelation and a gift which transcend all limit and measure. That is why, in the human communication of truth, even finite
communication must be the expression of an unlimited will to give of
oneself. A person must not present himself differently in different situations because it is pleasant for the other to hear that which will neither surprise nor shock; he would be hiding his lack of character with
a borrowed pretense. If he sees himself compelled to select and present
the truth he has to express in terms of a given situation, it must be
done in such a way that he stands fully committed and responsible for
each of his utterances. Every partial truth and every conscious reservation must, when viewed from an overall standpoint, be reconcilable and
thus justified. The differing manifestations of the truth which a person
is obliged to give in differing situations must be capable of forming a
totality from which the person's total life mission can be discovered.
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From this totality which must be seen and felt as the basis of every
partial manifestation, the partial truth becomes a possible expression
of the unlimited truth. If it is, then it no longer requires a formalistic
casuistry to justify it.
It is in the relation between the partial truth, which at times is all
that can be expressed, and the spirit of total truth which animates it
in a hidden way, that we can discover the rules essential to the employment of truth. Every abuse of truth can be identified with an operation in which one erects something fragmentary into a perfect and autonomous synthesis, to the disadvantage of the total truth. Take, for
example, the case of a person who closes himself to the absolute truth
on the basis of a standpoint that is only partially true. The partial
standpoint can be one particular preconceived opinion whose limitations one either does not see or does not want to see. It could also be
an entire system of meanings, a Weltanschauung which one has sought
as a refuge, and which no longer permits a wider perspective. The error
always lies in drawing the limit in respect to a broader truth, in hardening and absolutizing a finite perspective which one refuses to see as
merely a part, an expression of transcendent and infinite truth. T h e
abuse is not in the fact that the person knows only a fragment of infinite truth; it lies rather in satisfaction with this fragment and a consequent separation from the living sources of truth. He makes himself
a slave of the error when he separates himself from love. For it is love
that assures him of this more open point of view which he cannot reach
through knowledge alone. In love he opens himself unconditionally and
so is open to all truth which is beyond him and his personal standpoint.
In love, he wills to let things have more meaning than he himself is
capable of viewing or judging. Love is that receptivity which accords
to every external truth the right of revealing itself as such. Love is the
most universal a priori of all, for it presupposes nothing other than
itself.
In the discussion of the partial standpoints and perspectives which
are the occasion for most dialogues among men, from the most commonplace differences of opinion to the most decisive exchanges between
world-views and confessions, there can be no higher rule for the employment of truth than that of wholeness. T h e claim of each partial
perspective to truth will be directly proportional to its ability to integrate a greater measure of truth into itself. A partial truth which
becomes defensive, which hardens towards other truths, is, by that very
fact, convicted as second-rate in the over-all competition among truths.
A partial truth which usurps for itself a portion of the truth and then
removes itself from the totality of truth—this is the essence of heresy
and sectarianism. Only the naivete and ignorance of individuals concerning the negative character of the fixation which lies at the heart of
the sect can, in spite of everything, provide its adherents a fruitful ad28
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hesion to the total truth, and thereby their salvation. For he alone will
be saved who possesses love, which is another way of saying that he
alone will be saved who stands at the very source of truth. No partial
truth can express the true essence of a spiritual and immortal person.
Without a relation to the absolute truth, such a person cannot manifest himself as he should. This relation will be possible only if he allows his partial knowledge to become, thanks to love, virtually limitless.
Love is the opposite of sectarian argumentativeness. It is prepared to
give precedence to another's truth over its own. It has the freedom to
assent to all truths, even those it does not immediately see and cannot
judge; this is so because all truth comes from love. Love is far-sighted
enough to view a partial truth from the standpoint of the totality of
truth, which in this way can then be given a hierarchical arrangement.
Love knows which truths are encompassing and which are encompassed.
It can always achieve the higher and broader standpoint, and this ability is its strongest weapon in the dialogue between world-views. It conquers its enemies not so much by the precision of its answers as from
the fullness of its truth. It shows its opponent that whatever he has to
say is already included in its position, and has perhaps even been
adopted. Love does not judge, it merely suggests; it limits itself to convincing the other by the power of its radiating presence.
Finally, love is so convinced of the total character of truth, so sure
of itself in the very act of self-surrender, that it is prepared to give up
its own partial standpoint for the sake of this totality. The necessity of
this totality of truth is clearly seen as more important than fighting
one's way with partial evidence, even if a long personal effort could
win the argument. The authenticity of truth is shown in this sign that
partial truth is always prepared to renounce itself when the totality of
truth is at stake. For love, this renunciation is not an absurd sacrifice,
for it is always prepared to deny itself for the sake of another. At times
what is renounced is one's personal perspective, which is hard to surrender, but no personal perspective expresses the whole truth, which
can only be embodied through love. Love's renunciation of a partial
truth for the sake of love is one of the highest forms of manifesting
the truth.
Love makes things crystal clear; it makes it possible to see both the
depth and the height of things. As a result of its movement of selfdonation, love is endowed with a flood of truths whose high point is
a fullness which no human arrangement can penetrate. Hence, the more
love reveals itself, the more it is enriched with new truths to be communicated.
Its inner wealth becomes greater to the degree that it gives of itself.
The more it reveals itself, the greater its mystery becomes. No truth
which proceeds from the center of self-revealing being is exhaustible;
in the movement of truth one always knows more than he can express.
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Knowledge makes one lonely, especially when it is the knowledge of love.
The lover would have to lie under the weight of mysteries if they could
not be entrusted to Infinite Truth, to God as the co-knower of mysteries. The insoluble burden of the incommunicable in all effacement
and revelation, which increases as communication increases, brings out
another characteristic of truth lying behind all clear disclosures: truth
always conceals in itself an enduring mystery.
translated by

30

GERALD FARLEY

CROSS CURRENTS: WINTER 1962

